

**NON-STATEWIDE PARTIES AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE:  
THE CASE OF SPAIN (1977-2008)**

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## INTRODUCTION <sup>4</sup>

One of the most unusual characteristics of the Spanish political system is the existence of Non-Statewide Parties (NSWPs) (Pallarés, 1991; Montabes, 1994; Pallarés, Montero, Llera 1997). However, this is not a new phenomenon, since there have always been regional parties in Spain (De la Granja, Beramendi and Anguera, 2003). The strength of these parties, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country, ended up making the struggle for democracy inseparable from national demands during the transition to democracy following the Franco dictatorship. The electoral and parliamentary weight achieved by Basque and Catalan nationalists in the first democratic elections was reflected in Title VIII of the Spanish Constitution, which led to the development of the territorial distribution of powers between Central government and the Autonomous Communities. It would nonetheless be a mistake to confine the phenomenon of the NSWPs to the historical territories or to differential factors, since the institutional conditions and the characteristics of Spanish political power that have accompanied the consolidation of the territorial distribution of powers between Central government and the Autonomous Communities have acted as a source of *political pluralism* in the regional arena (Vallés, 1987; Botella, 1989; Morata, 2001). In this sense, the territorial distribution of powers between Central government and the Autonomous Communities has not only tended to reinforce the presence of NSWPs where they already existed, but also have favoured the emergence of new parties of this type.

This paper has a dual objective. Firstly, seek to contribute to the conceptual discussion on NSWPs in an attempt to differentiate the NSWPs from statewide parties. This classification will in turn demonstrate the diversity among the former on the basis of their territorial establishment and their institutional position in the Spanish multi-level political system. Secondly, an attempt will be made to classify the NSWPs in terms of their influence in the national and autonomous community arenas.

### 1. ANALYSIS OF NSWPs IN A MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM: CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL POINTS.

#### 1.1. THE COMPLEX DISTINCTION BETWEEN STATEWIDE PARTIES AND NON-STATEWIDE PARTIES

The parties that are only established in a limited part of the state territory tend to be, generally speaking, parties that emerged as a result of centre-periphery divide (Seiler, 1980)<sup>5</sup>. One of the more accepted suggestions for resolving this terminological dispute is the name Non-Statewide Parties (NSWPs), proposed by Molas (1977). According to his definition, the NSWPs are those parties "whose basic scope of community solidarity is territorially different (inferior) to that of the State" (Molas, 1977: 188). The definition is

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<sup>5</sup> Numerous authors have referred to them, according to their political goals. This is why they have been called periphery defence parties (Seiler, 1980), autonomist parties (Seiler, 1982; De Winter, Gomez-Reino and Lynch, 2006), regionalist parties (Newman, 1994, De Winter and Türsan, 1998; Héller, 2002), ethno-regionalists (Levi and Hechter, 1985; Muller-Rommel, 1994; De Winter, 1998) or minority nationalist parties (Elijah and Tronconi, press).

based therefore on a variable that is half way between geography and ideology: *the territorial environment in which the party's community solidarity is located*. Despite the fact that Molas did not expand on his definition, he did nonetheless refer to the two major strategic options that such parties could adopt. On the one hand, the desire to maintain a particular political entity whose historical origin and persistence does not threaten the existence of a broader nation and on the other, the existence of communities which, via some or all of their parties, deny the national character of the state territory as a whole. All of this helps to set the NSWPs apart from strictly local parties, and above all, avoids the always confrontational definition of the political project and the ideology of this type of party (Pallarés, Montero and Llera, 1997).

However, the concept is not without problems, especially when it comes to defining the territorial scope of community solidarity (Seiler, 1994). The alternative used by the majority of specialists has been to concentrate on the parties' electoral establishment. In this regard it is assumed that, unlike statewide parties (SWPs), NSWPs are those parties that are not established throughout a State's territory. However, in reality this approach also presents problems, since, as will be seen, none of the major Spanish parties comply strictly with it.

To try to overcome this problem, we shall adapt the typology drawn up by Deschouwer (2006) for classifying parties in multi-level systems based on two variables: The first is the degree of territorial penetration, which can distinguish between those parties that are established in a single region, those which are in some of them, and those which are in all the regions. The second distinguishes the type of elections for which the various political parties (state parties, sub-state parties that are not local, or both) put themselves forward. Unlike Deschouwer, our adaptation of the classification will measure establishment in terms of the presenting of candidacies, as an indicator of the will to be present. In addition, in order to consider a party as being an SWP, it will not need to be one that puts candidates forwards in *all* the national territory but rather in *almost all*. Furthermore, only those parties that have won parliamentary representation at some point, either in national or autonomous community elections, will be classified. Thus, according to that established, the NSWP category will include all parties that only put forward candidates in some regions and obtain representation in some of these arenas. However, some parties defend a territorial scope of community solidarity that does not coincide with the official borders of one or several regions, but that have transversal borders (this is a common phenomenon not only in Spain but also in Belgium and Italy). To take these cases into account, we shall also extend the definition of NSWPs to include those parties that put candidates forward and have obtained parliamentary representation in more than one region - parties that we will refer to as diaterritorial parties.

The adaptation of the typology drawn up by Deschouwer allows us to overcome Molas's conceptual problem with regard to parties that are not established in all the regions. In addition, adding the second variable on the participation in elections allows a much better definition of the variety of parties existing in multi-level systems. The only major drawback that arises is that regarding the territorial alliances between an SWP and an NSWP<sup>6</sup>. In these cases, the real problem is making clear whether we are dealing with different parties and therefore a case of territorial alliances of different parties, or on the contrary, if we are dealing with (more or less autonomous) territorial sections of one particular party. In order to overcome this obstacle, we shall here maintain that these parties are NSWPs of a different nature to the rest due to their

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<sup>6</sup> This is the case, for instance, of the CDU and the CSU in Germany, of the Lega Norte and Forza Italia in Italy, or the PSOE and the PSC, of the PP and the UPN and of the IU and ICV in Spain.

stable and privileged relationships with SWPs. In every case, these are sovereign formations with freedom of action in the regional arena, but not independent of the referred to SWP in the statewide arena. The rest of the NSWPs act independently of the SWPs in all arenas. As we shall see, this distinction has important implications for determining the role of these parties.

## 1.2. THE POWER OF THE NSWPs IN A MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM

The importance of the parties within the political system has tended to be determined by taking the national sphere as a unit of analysis unit. Only recently have the first studies begun to appear which attempt to understand how the multi-level nature of many political systems affects their role and their operation (Deschouwer, 2001 and 2003; Montero and Lago, 2009; Stefiruc, 2009; Swenden and Maddens, 2009; Elias and Tronconi, at press). On the other hand the bulk of comparative studies into non-statewide parties have focused their attention primarily on parties that obtain representation on the national level, a selection process that often leaves numerous NSWPs out of the analysis (De Winter, 1995; De Winter et. alt., 2006).

This study aims to contribute to overcoming both limitations. To do so, it proposes establishing a classification of NSWPs in accordance with their political influence in two arenas: in central institutions and in autonomous institutions. An approach of this kind will, without doubt, improve the understanding of the role played by this type of party in multi-level systems. The classification is inspired by the criteria proposed by Sartori to determine whether parties count (Sartori, 1976: 105 and ss). On the basis of these, we can deduce the existence of a number of different thresholds for the level of influence attained by the parties: the representation threshold, the relevance threshold and the governance threshold<sup>7</sup>. This reveals which parties count and how they go about it.

The operational definition of these three thresholds is not without problems. Both the representation threshold and the governance threshold are defined by the institutional position of the parties: having seats in parliament (at each level) for the former case, and being present in the executive (at each level) for the latter. However, defining presence in the government also has its drawbacks. On the one hand, as studies examining party government have highlighted, the influence of parties on its functioning distorts the classical ideas about what does or does not constitute government according to the classical constitutional theory (Duverger, 1957; Castles and Wildenmann, 1986; Katz, 1987; Blondel and Cotta, 2000). In this context, our position will be to maintain the definition of government as being the executive body, following the criterion more commonly accepted within academia and by Sartori himself (1976), despite the fact that it can present limitations when addressing the role of the parties in governance<sup>8</sup>. On the other hand, there is the problem of how to consider the relationship between NSWPs and national parties when the latter are in the executive.

<sup>7</sup> Thresholds similar to these have been used by various authors to study the *vital stages* of the parties and their organisational effects (Pedersen, 1982; Müller-Rommel, 2002; Deschouwer, 2007; Elías an Tronconi, at press).

<sup>8</sup> As Duverger argued: "the influence of the parties leads to the acceptance of a relativity of governmental structures, which can be modified by the sole evolution of the relationship of the political forces within the country" (1957: 419). In this regard the existence of political parties means that the distinction between parliamentary majority and government may be much more diffuse than constitutionalism maintains. This has various implications, such as, for example, in defining the duration of governments. Significantly, Blondl (1968) chose to consider the periods with the same prime minister or "the same support of parties in parliament" (Blondl, 1968: 190). More recently Colomer (1998: 51) or Montero (2005-70) have used the term "horizontal divided government" to refer to those situations in which the parties that make up the executive and those which provide it with parliamentary support do not coincide.

Laver and Shofield (1990: 243-244) addressed this question when considering the nature of the accord between the CDU-CSU, and revealed the diversity of views among academics. In accordance with that established in the preceding paragraph, our approach will be to consider the parties as being different when this distinction can be made on both a legal and organisational basis.

As Sartori has already pointed out, the most difficult threshold to define is that of relevance, since this is not defined only from the institutional point of view. According to his judgment, what matters in determining the relevance of a party is its potential for making coalitions<sup>9</sup>, not all those that are mathematically possible, but rather only those that are ideologically viable. This allows one to take into account smaller parties likely to form a part of parliamentary majorities, regardless of: a) whether they occupy a position in the executive; b) whether they form a part of the parliamentary majority; c) or whether they limit themselves to providing occasional support. This work will thus consider that the NSWPs count whenever they can meet any of these three conditions, and will consider as not counting those which have only achieved representation and are not in a position to satisfy any of the conditions.

Classifying the various NSWPs into each of these thresholds, both for the national level and for the regional one, will allow us to show the influence that each of them has on Spain's multi-level political system. The classification will distinguish different types of NSWP, depending on whether they have been in the government and have been relevant or not in the two arenas, in only one of them, or in neither.

## **2. NSWPs IN SPAIN: A CLASSIFICATION BASED ON THEIR TERRITORIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PRESENCE**

### **2.1. THE NSWPs IN THE SPANISH POLITICAL ARENA.**

In the current democratic period, the Spanish party system has been characterised by a tendency to concentrate national representation in the two major national level parties (Ocaña and Oñate, 2007). However, this apparent hegemony of the major parties has been compatible with the presence of numerous NSWPs.

Since the first elections in 1977, the NSWPs have always had representation in both chambers of the Spanish parliament<sup>10</sup>. The influence of the NSWPs in those elections was very significant, demonstrating that one of the characteristics of the Spanish political system is the constant and numerous representation of this type of party in the central institutions (Montero, Gunther and Botella, 2004). All together there were 8 candidacies formed by NSWPs that won representation in the Spanish Lower House, making up 47 of the 350 seats at stake. Three parliamentary groups were formed from MPs from NSWPs: The Basque group (PNV), the Minority Catalan group (with MPs from PDC and UDC-CC, which a year later would converge into CiU<sup>11</sup>) and the Catalan socialist group, highlighting the degree of autonomy that the pre-election pact with the

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<sup>9</sup> Sartori (1976: 108) also established as a criterion of reference the potential for blackmail, although this is very difficult to apply to the case of the NSWPs, as it was conceived for the major communist parties in Europe during the Cold War. In the case we are interested in it could only be applied, and with differences, to HB in the Basque and Navarre sphere.

<sup>10</sup> To simplify the analysis, we shall only consider representation in the Spanish Lower House and not in the Senate.

<sup>11</sup> For the purposes of this analysis we consider CiU as one party and not as two, since its two components have never been presented candidates to elections independently, with the exception of the elections in 1977 (Barberà and Barrio, 2006).

PSOE had given them. The rest of the NSWP MPs joined the mixed group. The NSWPs in the constituent legislature had very disparate degrees of influence and integration. Some of these, articulated by means of transitory coalitions<sup>12</sup>, were very important in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In general terms, the parties that succeeded in obtaining representation in these early elections have maintained it up to now, with the exception of the ERC, EE or PAR, whose representation in Congress has been more intermittent.

If the constituent parliamentary term revealed the influence of the NSWPs from Catalonia and the Basque Country (two of the territories that had already enjoyed autonomy during the Second Republic), the first constitutional term opened the doors to the presence of new parties from other communities. This is the case of the Partido Socialista de Andalucía (PSA) or of the Unión del Pueblo Canario (UPC). In Navarra, the UPN achieved representation as a result of a tacit accord with Alianza Popular (AP)<sup>13</sup>. All these parties were joined by the newly created Herri Batasuna (HB), linked to the terrorist group ETA. The result was that in these elections the number of NSWPs with representation rose to 11, making a total of 53 MPs. To the previous parliamentary groups was now added that of the Andalusians, while the Basques and Navarre socialists also formed their own group, following the earlier example of the PSC.

Despite the overwhelming absolute majority obtained by the PSOE in 1982, the presence of the NSWPs did not decline substantially in terms of total representation. There were a total of 8 NSWPs that won representation, consisting of 52 seats. However, this figure conceals a large variety of circumstances that need to be emphasised. Thus, while some parties such as the PSC, CiU, PNV or UPN increased their representation, others saw theirs drastically reduced (PSUC) or lost (PSA, UPC)<sup>14</sup>. In parallel, the new parliamentary regulation dissolved the Basque and Catalan socialist groups.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Legislatures were marked by the rise of the NSWPs, which were able to benefit from electoral deadlock of the AP and the electoral decline of the PSOE. In the general elections in 1986, a total of 11 NSWPs obtained representation with a total of 59 seats. In these elections for the first time *Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias* (AIC), *Unió Valenciana* (UV) and *Coalición Galega* (CG) obtained representation, whereas the PAR re-obtained representation after being absent from parliament for a term. In contrast, ERC disappeared from the house for two terms due to the crisis that it underwent in the second half of the 1980s. In contrast, the strategy of giving impetus to the Partido Reformista (1986) allowed CiU to obtain a marked increase in votes in Catalonia, rising from 12 to 16 members between 1982 and 1986. In 1989, the Spanish Lower House was constituted not only with a larger number of NSWPs but also with more members from these formations. A total of 12 NSWPs obtained representation, making a total of 63 seats, the highest figure obtained up until then.

During the first half of the 1990s, the consolidation of the PP as an alternative and the electoral mobilisation of the PSOE in response to the expectation of a change of government increased the competitiveness of the elections. This led to a reduction of the presence of NSWPs in the Lower Spanish House, and of their number of seats, which fell to 56 in the elections in 1993 and 1996. However some parties benefited from the strong polarisation that existed between the PP and PSOE. In the 1993

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<sup>12</sup> *Socialistes de Catalunya* –embryo of the PSC, *Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya* (PDC), ERC, PSUC and *Unió del Centre i la Democràcia Cristiana per Catalunya* (UC-DCC)

<sup>13</sup> AP agreed not to put forward candidates in exchange for the promise of UPN to join the popular group in parliament, which in the end did not come about.

<sup>14</sup> Anticipating probable poor results, PAR agreed to a coalition pact with AP in these elections.

elections, ERC regained the representation lost during the 1980s, and in 1996, the NBG succeeded for the first time in obtaining a seat in the Lower House. For its part, the CC first formed a parliamentary group of its own thanks to two members of UPN that the PP provided in exchange for its support for the parliamentary stability of the government, an option that was readopted in 2000. The other side of the coin was the situation regarding EE and PAR, who lost their representation in 1993. The internal crisis in the EE led to its integration into the Basque PSOE. For its part, the PAR formed a coalition with the PP in 1996, which allowed them to keep their MP and obtain three senators.

In 2000, the PP's absolute majority was accompanied by some changes in the NSWPs' representation. From the outset, HB refused to stand for the elections in the wake of ETA's decision to end its truce, and thus lost their presence in the Lower House which had been continuous since 1979. The PP's electoral growth also ended the representation that UV had maintained since 1986. On the contrary, Chunta Aragonésista (CHA) managed to obtain parliamentary representation, occupying the Aragonist presence that had traditionally belonged to the PAR, which was this time left without a seat.

In the 2004 elections, the number of parties present was maintained, although their influence in terms of seats increased slightly. The explanation for this can be found in the progress of the NSWPs in Catalonia, and in particular, the remarkable increase of ERC, which went from one MP to eight, and the recovery of the PSC, which obtained four new members. The main casualty of this advance of left-wing Catalan NSWPs was CiU, which lost five seats and was left with 10 MPs, its lowest representation to date. Lastly, a new NSWP also emerged in Navarra, *Nafarroa Bai* (NaBai), a nationalist coalition that won the Navarre seat that HB had held in 1986 and IU in 1996.

However, in 2008 the concentration of the vote around the PSOE and PP led to a reduction of the number of NSWPs present in the parliament and a fall in the number of MPs, a circumstance that affected all the NSWPs, with the exception of the PSC and CiU. The presence of NSWPs was reduced to 9 parties, since EA and CHA lost their presence in the Lower Spanish House.

## 2.2 NSWPs IN THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES

The presence of NSWPs in the different Autonomous Communities is highly variable and depends on multiple factors<sup>15</sup>. The first distinction is between those communities that have always had NSWPs in their autonomous parliaments and those in which the presence of NSWPs has been intermittent. However, there is no uniformity among the former, since there are NSWPs that have always been majority parties and NSWPs that occupy marginal positions.

The first group is of those Communities in whose parliaments there have always been NSWPs. The most outstanding case is that of Catalonia, whose primary electoral and parliamentary force has always been an NSWP. The Catalan parliament represents a quite exceptional case, since the influence of the SWPs is scarce, and they have only succeeded in achieving third position on some occasions. This is the result of the existence of the PSC's alliance with the PSOE, and the electoral strength of CiU, which

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<sup>15</sup> There are many analyses of the results of NSWPs in the autonomous community sphere. A sample of the main ones can be obtained in Pallarés, 1991; Pallarés, Montero and Llera, 1998; Pallarés, 1994; Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Montabes, 1994; Alcántara and Martínez 1998; Revenga and Sánchez, 2002; Wert, 2003.

has always been the party with the most seats. In addition to CiU and PSC, other minor NSWPs have always been present in the parliament, often occupying third position. There have also been other special situations over these years. In the first parliamentary term, the PSA, an Andalusian NSWP which can be considered as having been a diaterritorial party at that time. While not considering Catalonia as part of its territory of community solidarity, in the early years of the autonomy it aspired to capture the vote of the many Andalusians residing in Catalonia, which it referred to as *the ninth province of Andalusia*. One should also mention the existence of *Ciutadans*-Partido de la Ciudadanía (C's), which in 2008 acceded to the *Parlament* just a few months after its creation. *Ciutadans* aspired to act as an NSWP, by submitting candidacies in all the constituencies in the 2004 Spanish elections, without obtaining a single seat.

As in Catalonia, in the Basque Country there have always been NSWPs in the Parliament, and the primary electoral force has also been an NSWP (the PNV). In contrast, SWPs have had greater influence, so that there has always been an SWP in second place. Behind these there have been other NSWPs with less influence, among which we should highlight the presence of HB, as well as the counterpart organisations that appeared after the outlawing of HB, such as Euskal Herritarrok or the Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas). HB, EH and PCTV have represented the electoral space favourable or close to the terrorist activity of ETA, and have thus acted as anti-system parties. Other NSWPs have been Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), which emerged from a split with the PNB in 1986, and Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), which maintained representation until 1993, when it merged with the PSOE's Basque territorial section. In the eighth parliamentary term Aralar entered the parliament, a breakaway group from HB representing former HB voters who rejected ETA's political violence. Mention should lastly be made of the parliamentary presence on several occasions of Unidad Alavesa (AU), a party that emerged from a split with the PP. The consideration of UA as an NSWP arises because its sphere of solidarity is the province of Alava, and hence it could be considered as being a local party. As a general feature, it should be noted that all NSWPs are diaterritorial, since they claim a more extensive territorial sphere of solidarity, Euskal Herria, which includes Euskadi, Navarre and the Basque territories in France.

Although there have always been NSWPs in the parliament of Navarre, in the first two terms of the autonomous parliament the parties with the highest number of votes and seats were SWPs. The party system in Navarre was marked by three distinctive features. Firstly, by the presence of diaterritorial NSWPs, all those NSWPs that put themselves forward in both the Basque Country and in Navarre, considered integral parts of the same nation (PNV, HB, EA, and Aralar,); secondly, due to the initial division of the Navarre right wing, which encouraged ephemeral NSWPs like the UDF; finally, its main NSWP, the UPN, maintained an alliance with the PP between 1991 and 2008, based on the principle of territoriality, with the result that the latter party ceased to exist in that community. This situation meant that, from 1991 onwards, the UPN became the primary party in the autonomous community sphere and has governed the Community almost continuously since then.

Although the NSWPs have always had representation in the Canary Islands, their situation has suffered ups and downs. In the first three autonomous parliament terms, the PSOE was the leading party. This situation changed in 1991, with the forming of the Coalición Canaria (CC), heir to the AIC coalition, becoming the leading party in the autonomous sphere until 2007, when it was once more overtaken by the PSOE. The rest of the parties, some of them only established in one island, have had a low presence, with the exception of AHI, which has only been absent from parliament in the sixth parliamentary term.



In Galicia there has also been a continued presence of NSWPs in the autonomous parliament, although the main parties have always been SWPs. For their part, the NSWPs have never been able to pass from being the third force, with some rather uneven results. The BNG, a party that has been gradually absorbing other minor formations, has always obtained representation while PSG and EG obtained parliamentary presence in the first parliamentary terms and then converged into the BNG. CG, in contrast, only gained representation from the second to the fourth term.

In Aragon, the leading party has always been the PAE. Generally speaking, the NSWPs have never risen above third place, despite their continuous presence in the parliament. On the other hand, although the number of NSWPs present in the parliament has varied, their electoral and parliamentary influence has maintained a consistent pattern from 1987 until 2007, when they experienced a major decline.

In Cantabria there have always been NSWPs in parliament, among which the PRC occupies a prominent place, a party whose influence has been increasing over the years. In 2003 it achieved the presidency of the autonomic government and in 2007 became the second political force. In contrast, the presence of the UPCA has been fleeting, despite being very relevant in the third parliamentary term, when it split from the Cantabria PP.

In the Balearic Islands there have always been various NSWPs in parliament since the first parliamentary term, with an influence that has been fairly stable over the years, and always situated as a third force behind the SWPs. Some have been present in all the autonomous parliamentary terms, either with their own candidacy or by means of various coalitions, while others have had a more intermittent presence. Worth mentioning in the context of the Balearic Islands is the presence of a diaterritorial NSWP – ERC - in parliament since 2007, although it has always presented in coalition with other NSWPs.

In La Rioja, the influence of NSWPs is very marginal although stable. Since the first parliamentary term the PR has always obtained two seats and has ended up being the third political force since 1991.

A second group consists of those communities where the presence of the NSWPs in the autonomous parliaments has been intermittent (Andalusia, Valencia, Asturias, Castilla Leon and Extremadura). In Andalusia, the PSA was present in parliament from the first term until 2007, when it disappeared from the Andalusian parliament. Its electoral and parliamentary dimension was low and it never rose above being the fourth political force. In Valencia, the UV was present in the second to fourth parliamentary terms, while ERC has also presented candidates on several occasions, although it has never obtained representation. In Asturias, the PAS and the URAS only obtained representation from the third to the sixth parliamentary terms. In Castilla-Leon the UPL has had parliamentary presence since the fourth parliamentary term and TC-PNC only during the fifth term. The UPL may also be considered to be a diaterritorial NSWP, since it also presented candidates in Asturias, although without obtaining representation. Lastly, in Extremadura, EU obtained representation in the first two parliamentary terms, while the CREX-PREX coalition achieved parliamentary presence on one occasion. Subsequently both formations have obtained parliamentary representation via candidacies of the PP and PSOE respectively.

Lastly, there is a group of communities that constitute a real exception, in which NSWPs have never obtained parliamentary representation (Madrid, Castilla-La Mancha and Murcia). This does not mean that there are no such parties in these regions. In the case of Castilla and Murcia, the hegemony of the SWPs (in Castilla la Mancha) and the

conditions laid down by electoral law (Murcia) have prevented the entry of these formations, which have been relegated to local representation in certain municipalities. The fact that there are no NSWPs<sup>16</sup> in Madrid may be due, among other reasons, to the capital effect, by which the presence of the headquarters of all political parties at a national level (the large, the small and the residual) monopolises political representation. However, this is also a phenomenon that reflects a singularity in terms of political culture that could merit closer observation.

### 2.3. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PARTIES IN SPAIN: NSWPs AND SWPs

Based on the presence of Spanish parties in the state and autonomous community arenas, the different types of parties existing in Spain can be identified, as shown in Table 1. On the one hand, a small number of parties that are considered SWPs, according to the definition offered in the previous section. On the other hand, a large and diverse group of PANE, characterised by their diversity. The vast majority of these put forward candidates in one region and only gain representation in the autonomous elections. A second group consists of those parties which obtain representation in both the national elections and the autonomous elections. This category includes almost all the major NSWPs: CiU, CC, BNG, PAR PSC or UPN. Thirdly, there are those parties that put forward candidates in more than one region, and which in turn, obtain or have obtained representation in autonomous and general elections. In this category are some parties that are present in the Basque Country and Navarre (PNV, EA, EE and HB).

Table 1. Classification of NSWPs and SWPs. Spain (1980-2008)

		Representation in elections		
		Regional only	National only	Regional & National
<b>candidacies</b>	<b>One region</b>	Asturias: PAS, URAS Baleares: AIPF, CIM, PACTE, PSM (Mall), PSM (Men), UM Canarias: AC-INC/ICAN, AGI, AHI, AM, CNC, FNC, PCN Cantabria: PRC, UPCA Castilla y León: UPL, TC-PNC <u>Cataluña: C's</u> Extremadura: UE, CREX-PREX Galicia: EG, PSG Navarra: CDN, UDF País Vasco: PCTV, UA Rioja: PR		Aragón: CHA, PAR Canarias: UPC, AIC/CC Cataluña: CIU, ICV, PSC Galicia: BNG, CG Navarra: UPN, NaBai Valencia: UV
	<b>A number of regions</b>	Aralar, EA, EE, ERC, HB-EH, PNV, PSA		
	<b>Almost all the regions</b>	AP/PP, CDS, PCE/IU, PSOE, UCD, UpD		

Source: Own adaptation from Tables A1 and A2 and of Deschouwer (2006: 292). Only parties or coalitions presenting themselves for elections are considered. The distinction according to the candidacies variable only takes into account the candidacies that have obtained representation. The table marked in bold represents the different methods adopted by the NSWPs.

Abbreviations: see list of abbreviations in the appendices.

<sup>16</sup> We should mention the existence of Primero Madrid (PM), the new name of the Partido Regionalista Independiente de Madrid (PRIM), created in 1988 from two defecting MPs from PP, who moved to the Joint Group and from there supported the PSOE government majority. Although it has continued to present candidates for elections, it has never obtained any representative and has received virtually no electoral support.

We should also mention the case of Aralar, which is present in the Basque Country and Navarre, although it has not obtained representation in the general elections<sup>17</sup>. In contrast, less relevant is the presence of PSA, which presented candidates only in the first autonomy elections in Catalonia, and ERC, since its presence in the Balearic Islands and the Comunidad Valenciana is residual and its existence responds more to the desire of the parent party to respect a pan-Catalan ideological criterion than a genuine social involvement. This same consideration may be made with TC-NCB, UPL and PAS, which do not appear in this last category, because they put forward candidates in more than one community, but only obtained representation in one of them.

### **3. THE POWER OF THE NSWPS IN A MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT**

#### **3.1. NSWPs AND THE GOVERNANCE OF THE STATE**

It is customary in analyses of the party system in Spain to consider that in the current democratic period there have only been governments of a single colour. This is true for the case of the UCD governments, but it is more questionable in the case of the PSOE governments, and with some important nuances, those of the PP. Indeed, the governments of the PSOE can be considered one-party governments if the ministers from the PSC can be considered as members of the same force as the ministers of the PSOE, given the alliance between the two parties. In contrast, as is sustained here, the nature of a stable SWP-NSWP between PSOE and PSC converts the parliamentary majority and the resulting executive into a majority made up of at least two parties. This situation is especially relevant for understanding the functioning of this majority, since in order to make up the socialist government majority, the PSC's seats have always been crucial. In the case of the PP governments, we are faced with the same type of SWP-NSWP alliance, by which the members of the PP and UPN shared the same government majority. However, in this case there are two nuances that distinguish them from the socialist alliance. On the one hand, the quantitative significance of UPN is not the same as that of the PSC. Although it can be considered that the parliamentary majority that sustained the PP governments was made up, from 1996 onwards, of at least two parties, in the case of UPN its members were never essential in ensuring that majority. Secondly, the UPN never had ministers in the PP cabinets.

In the rest of the NSWPs, its contribution to Spanish political governance has been limited to the parliamentary arena, since they have never been integrated into any government, despite the fact that some of these NSWPs have enjoyed potential coalitions in more than half of the parliamentary terms, as shown in Table 2. This has led to the existence of many minority governments, sustained on some occasions by term-long accords, and on others, by particular legislative agreements.

The participation of the NSWPs in governance, and consequently their relevance, has been influenced by their ideological identity. Most of these parties are situated in central positions in the left-right divide, or maintain a pragmatic attitude in the territorial-national divide (Pallarés, 1991; Pallarés, Montero and Llera, 1997). This has allowed them to adopt a pivotal strategy and to support both PSOE and PP, and in its day, UCD. This is the case of the most relevant NSWPs, such as CiU, PNV or CC. In contrast, there is a group of NSWPs that are more left-leaning and more radically

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<sup>17</sup> Aralar forms part of the NaBai coalition, which won a seat in 2004 and 2008.

nationalist, which have only reached agreements with the PSOE. An extreme case is HB/EH, whose anti-system nature invalidates it as a parliamentary partner, although its absence during all the 1989-1993 parliamentary term allowed the PSOE to have an absolute de facto majority (Reniu, 2002). Obviously, in this sense PSC and UPN have had a restriction that forms an essential part of their ties to statewide parties. It must be said that in the autonomous community arena the ideological determinant is diluted, giving them a clearer function of pivotal parties, and enabling more complex coalition arrangements.

**Table 2. Maximum influence attained by NSWPs in the Lower House (1979-2009) <sup>(\*)</sup>**

	I 79-82	II 82-86	III 86-89	IV 89-93	V 93-96	VI 96-00	VII 00-04	VIII 04-08	IX 08-
<b>Cabinet</b>		PSC <sup>1</sup>	PSC <sup>1</sup>	PSC <sup>1</sup>	PSC <sup>1</sup>			PSC <sup>1</sup>	PSC <sup>1</sup>
<i>(Total)</i>	(0)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)
<b>Relevance</b>	CiU PAR PNV PSA PSC <sup>1</sup> PSUC UPN <sup>2</sup>			AIC <sup>4</sup> HB <sup>3</sup>	CiU ICV	CC CiU PNV UPN <sup>2</sup>	UPN <sup>2</sup>	BNG CC CHA CIU EA ERC ICV NABAI PNV	BNG CC CIU ERC ICV NABAI PNV UPN <sup>2</sup>
<i>(Total)</i>	(7)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(1)	(9)	(8)
<b>Representation</b>	EE ERC HB UPC	CiU EE PSUC ERC HB PNV	AIC CG PAR ICV CiU EE PA PAR UV PNV	CiU PNV EA EE ICV PA PAR UPN <sup>1</sup> UV	CC ERC EA HB PAR PNV UPN <sup>2</sup> UV	BNG EA ERC HB ICV PSC <sup>1</sup> UV	BNG CC CHA CiU EA ERC ICV PA PNV	UPN <sup>2</sup>	
<i>(Total)</i>	(4)	(6)	(9)	(9)	(8)	(7)	(9)	(1)	(0)

Sources: Own preparation based on Table A1.

Abbreviations: see list of abbreviations in the appendices.

Notes: (\*) The 1977-1979 parliamentary term has not been included, since it was a pre-constitutional term, marked by the consensus among the various parliamentary groups, which distorts our criterion of relevance. 1. The PSC had its own group between 1977 and 1982. Since 1982 it has been integrated into the socialist group where it has always respected the whip of the PSOE. The PSC has always had ministers when the PSOE has been in government. 2. UPN formed part of the mixed group between 1979 and 1982. From 1982 to 1996 it was in the popular group. Between 1996 and 2000 it joined the CC group in order to encourage the latter's support for the PP. From 2000 to 2008 it remained in the popular group. During the years of the PP government it did not have ministers. Since 2009 UPN and PP have broken their alliance. 3. HB's elected members did not accept the accreditation of their seats, which contributed to the maintenance of an absolute majority of the PSOE. 4. AIC gave its support to the investiture of Gonzalez in 1989 in the first vote, as well as to the motion of confidence presented in 1990.

A second condition of the NSWP's parliamentary strategy has been determined by the political context and the type of parliamentary majority. During periods of absolute majority (the second, third, fourth and seventh parliamentary terms), there has been a distancing between government and opposition, so that the independent NSWPs have tended to reduce their cooperation with the parliamentary majority. However, in the case of the NSWPs that have participated in the autonomous government during a period of absolute majority in the Spanish Lower House, this relationship has been more nuanced. The coalition between PSOE and PNV in the Basque government

(1986-1990 and 1991-1998) encouraged dialogue between socialists and nationalists in the national arena<sup>18</sup>, as also happened between CC and PP in the 2000-2004 parliamentary term, which coincided with a coalition between the two in the Canary Island government. By contrast, the relationship between PSOE and CiU during a socialist absolute majority was marked by several clashes. In a different context, CiU's minority situation in the Catalan parliament favoured a much closer collaboration during much of the PP's absolute majority, in which the Prime Minister Aznar even went as far as to invite the nationalists to enter the government (Rodríguez, 2006). Subsequently, PP and CiU became more distanced a few months after the 2003 autonomous elections, because CiU wished to avoid a possible electoral punishment. The good relationship with CiU, which voted in favour of the investiture in the seventh parliamentary term contrasted with the political and institutional confrontation between the PP and PNV, caused by PNV's closeness to EH and the confrontational strategy of the PP in the Basque Country.

When there have been no situations of absolute majority for the party in government, the non-viability of stable coalitions between national parties, due to a lack of sufficient seats or the political competition between these, has resulted in the NSWPs becoming decisive agents for investing the Prime Minister and for maintaining the stability of the government, as shown in Table 2.

In the constituent parliamentary term, the absence of a constitutional parliamentary system and the policy of consensus meant that the government of Suarez could count on the collaboration of the main parties, with the drawing up of the "Magna Carta" as a backdrop. The understanding between the PSOE and the UCD facilitated governance, although this did not detract from the significance of the presence of NSWPs in the main agreements. The end of the policy of consensus in the first parliamentary term involved a rift between the UCD and the NSWPs, although the inauguration of Suarez (UCD) was supported by PSA, PAR and UPN, in addition to AP. However, the UCD's neglect of the nationalist demands made by CiU and PNV, who were initially prepared to vote in favour of Suarez, led to CiU abstaining and PNV voting against (Reniu, 2002). Two years later, the exceptional circumstances surrounding the inauguration of Calvo Sotelo (UCD), after the coup, favoured the vote in favour of UPN and the abstention of CiU, PAR and PSA. The progressive dismemberment of the UCD parliamentary group gave greater influence to the NSWPs on government as the parliamentary term went on, yet it never resulted in stable accords.

The PSOE-PSC majorities made the support of third parties unnecessary, but even so, both in 1982 and in 1989 Gonzalez was able to count on his investiture having the support of some NSWPs, EE in 1982 and AIC in 1989.

In the absence of an absolute majority, in the fifth parliamentary term Gonzalez faced the dilemma of forming a parliamentary coalition with either IU-IC or with CiU. Finally the PSOE-PSC opted for the latter. The agreement between PSOE and CiU was based on a pact for the investiture that was maintained subsequently as a result of negotiation between the two parties. The main results of the pact of 1993 were a reform of the system of financing of the autonomous communities and the transfer of some powers under the Catalan statute of autonomy that had not yet been made effective (Rodríguez Aguilera, 2001). Politically, the agreement between PSOE and CiU led to difficulties for the PSC in the Catalan parliament, with the party having to reduce its role as the main opposition party. CiU put an end to support for the Gonzalez government in the autumn

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<sup>18</sup> This collaboration encouraged the PNV to abstain in the investiture of Gonzalez in 1986 and 1989 in contrast to the other NSWPs. AIC voted in favour of González in 1989, as EE had also done in 1982 (Reniu, 2002).

of 1995, before the holding of autonomous elections in November of that year, in which a setback for the nationalist coalition was heralded. The end of the collaboration agreement between PSOE and CiU forced the government to extend the budgets of 1995 and precipitated the early dissolution of parliament.

In addition to the support of the PP and UPN, the investiture of Aznar after the 1996 elections was made possible thanks to the support of CiU, which was joined by PNV and CC. The involvement of the NSWPs on this occasion was much more stable than in the previous parliamentary term, since PP and CiU came to a full term accord, which however did not include its incorporation in the government. The main compensation for this agreement was the PP's support for CiU in the Catalan parliament, where the Catalan nationalists had lost their absolute majority, and a new reform of the financing, which raised the opposition of some communities governed by the PSOE. In 2000, even though the PP-UPN alliance won an absolute majority, it was able to count on CiU's vote in favour of the inauguration of Aznar, a fact that once again demonstrated the interdependence of scenarios, since the nationalists, again in a minority in the Catalan parliament, needed the support of the PP to remain in government.

After the general elections in 2004, for the investiture of Rodriguez Zapatero the PSOE-PSC was able to count on the support of ERC, CC, BNG, ICV and CHA, in addition to IU. Although the parliamentary situation was similar to that of other terms without a single-colour absolute majority, the political strategy to ensure the stability of the government followed a strategy that was very different from preceding ones. The high polarisation present throughout the parliamentary term frequently prevented the NSWPs from maintaining intermediate positions in parliamentary politics. In addition, the presence of the socialists in the coalition government with ERC and ICV in Catalonia, the poor performance of CiU (which no longer guaranteed by itself the socialist majority) and the political strategy of the *Lehendakari* Ibarretxe (which placed the PNV in an awkward position for forming pacts with the PSOE), meant that Zapatero would come to rely preferably on nationalist and left-wing groups for the rest of the parliamentary term without the need for stable accords. The fierce opposition adopted by the PP led to its political isolation, so that the PSOE often found it had the support of the other NSWPs only to avoid their alignment with the PP. However, the political erosion caused by the process of statutory reform in Catalonia deteriorated relations between PSOE and ERC, so that, in the second half of the parliamentary term, the socialists began to turn to CiU in search of support, which in turn destabilised the coalition shared by PSC and ERC in the Generalitat and eventually led to early elections in Catalonia. In 2008, despite the collaboration that the PSOE had maintained with some NSWPs during the previous term, Zapatero was invested in the second round only with the votes of his party and the PSC, which already gave him the simple majority he needed.

### **3.2. THE POWER OF THE NSWPS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA OF THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES**

In the arena of the autonomous communities the strength of the NSWPs has been very variable, and has fluctuated between: (A) parties that have only gained access to representation and thus do not count according to the analytical framework proposed; (b) parties that do count because they have had potential for government; and (c) parties that have almost always been in the government.

Table 3 shows the maximum threshold reached by the various NSWPs in the various autonomous parliamentary terms. The main conclusion that can be drawn is that the

NSWPs tend to experience a gradual transition from being parties that do not count to parties that do count. With the passing of the years, the NSWPs gradually achieve positions of influence and government more frequently, thereby reducing the number of NSWPs that do not count. It can even be observed that over time only those parties persist that have been able to achieve government at some point.

Table 3. Maximum influence attained by the NSWPs in the autonomous parliamentary terms.

<i>Legislaturas</i> <i>Umbral</i>	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII <sup>1</sup>
<b>Cabinet</b>	CiU PNV	AIC CG CiU ERC PAR PNG PNV PR UM	AHI/CCI/ AM/CAN <sup>3</sup> CC/AIC/ CiU PAR PNV PR UM UPCA UPN	CC CDN CiU EA EA (N) EE PAR PNV PRC UPN URAS UV	CC CiU EA PA PAR PNV PSM PRC UPN UM	CC CDN CiU EA PA PAR PNV PRC UPN	BNG CC CDN EA ERC ICV PAR PNV PRC PSC PSM UM UPN	EA ERC ICV PNV PSC
<i>(Total)</i>	2	9	12	11	10	9	13	5
<b>Relevance</b>	AGI AHÍ AM CNC EE ERC HB HB (N) PNV (N) PSC PSUC UM UPC UPN	AC-INC AM BNG EA (N) EE EE (N) HB HB (N) PR PSG UDF UPN UV	EA EA (N) EE HB HB (N)	HB HB (N) PAS UPCA	CHA EA (N) ERC HB HB (N) ICV PSC	ARALAR BNG CHA EA (N) ERC HB ICV PSC	CHA CiU EH NABAI	CiU PCTV
<i>(Total)<sup>2</sup></i>	13	11	3	3	5	7	4	2
<b>Representation</b>	BNG CIM EG EU PAR PR PRC PSA PSA (C) PSC PSM	BNG EU ICV PSA PSC PSG PSM	BNG CG ERC FIEF ICV PAS PRC PSA PSC PSG PSM UIM UV	AHI AIPF BNG CHA CREX- PREX ERC ICV PA PCN PR PSC PSM UA UM UPL	AHI BNG PR TC- PNC UA UPL URAS	AIPF FNC PA PR PSM UA UM UPL	AHI AIPF PR PA UPL	
<i>(Total)</i>	10	7	13	16	8	8	5	0

**Sources:** Own preparation, from the data from Table A2.

**Notes:** 1. The eighth term has only been attained in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and Andalucía. 2. Parties that present candidates in two different Communities are not counted. The highest level attained is counted. 3. The Canary Island parties that made up the government in the third parliamentary term formed the CC coalition from the general elections in 1993 onwards.

In fact, already during the first two parliamentary terms there were a large number of parties that stood on the threshold of relevance, although many of them were unable or did not know how to translate it into government posts. In contrast, from the third term onwards, the electoral erosion of the PSOE in several communities, enabled the

NSWPs to enter into government coalitions. The two NSWPs with a presence in an autonomous government in 1983 rose to 13 by 2007. Similarly, the 11 parties in the first autonomous parliamentary term that had *only* been able to reach the threshold of representation were reduced to 5 by the seventh term.

This evolution of the NSWPs from the threshold of representation to government is even more meaningful if we take into account the collective stability in the number of NSWPs that have entered the autonomous parliaments for these almost 30 years, which has gone from 24 to 22. Obviously, behind this stability there is a great diversity, since several parties have disappeared and others were created during the 1990s. Yet in general, we can say that the stability of the NSWPs has been linked to their ability to gain access to government, and that those were never able to go beyond the representation eventually ended up having internal crises that eventually led to them being expelled from parliamentary representation.

If one analyses the maximum degree of power acquired, it can be seen that in some communities, such as the Canary Islands, Catalonia and the Basque Country, NSWPs have always been present in the autonomous government. However, the most common pattern has been the presence of NSWPs in the government for a number of parliamentary terms. As a general idea however, an extension of the presence of NSWPs in government is seen in most Communities.

In only a few cases, the NSWPs are limited only to a position of representation. This only happened in the first parliamentary terms, when the national parties aspired to govern alone and the NSWPs agreed to give them support from the opposition. In contrast, from the 1990s onwards, the NSWPs began to translate their parliamentary representation into governmental participation. Among these Communities we should highlight the case of Navarre, Cantabria and Aragon where this presence has remained stable until the present (Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Wert, 1998). Only in Castilla Leon and Extremadura has the presence of the NSWPs not exceeded intermittent parliamentary representation, without the ability to achieve the position of influence and government, which has ended up threatening the existence of these parties.

### **3.3. CLASSIFICATION OF THE NSWPs ACCORDING TO THEIR INFLUENCE**

Based on the cross reference between the strength of the NSWPs in the state and autonomous community arenas, Table 4 allows us to identify the importance of the various parties in the whole multi-level Spanish system and establish a gradation.

From highest to lowest influence, in the first place we find only two NSWPs, the PSC and the UPN, that have occupied positions of government in their respective autonomous communities and which in turn are part of the parliamentary majority that maintains the government on a state level, and in the case of the PSC, even with ministerial presence. There exists therefore the situation that the only NSWPs in government in the two arenas are NSWPs which are allies of SWPs whose performance in the state arena is not independent but is linked to its SWP of reference. In second place, we find a large group of parties that have occupied positions of government in the autonomous community arena and who have counted in the state arena. These include CiU, PNV, CC, ERC, BNG and ICV, all of them NSWPs without organisational links with SWPs. In third place are governing parties in the autonomous community arena that have not exceeded the threshold of representation on the state level: AIC, PAR, CG, EA, UV and PA. There is also a group of parties which have



occupied positions of government at the autonomous community level that however have not been able to access representation in the Spanish Lower House. In turn there are some NSWPs that have only been able to access representation in the state arena, and to have a potential for coalition or 'blackmail' in the autonomous community arena (EE, HE, UPC, CHA, NABAI), and a very large group of formations that have been in the in the autonomous sphere and have nonetheless been unable to access representation at the state level. Lastly are the NSWPs that only obtain representation in the autonomous community arena.

**Table 4. Classification of the NSWPs based on their maximum influence in the national and autonomous community arenas.**

NATIONAL					
	Cabinet	Relevance	Representation	No Representation	
CCAA	Cabinet	PSC (04-)	UPN (96-04) <sup>1</sup> BNG (05-09) CC (96-00) CiU (80-82; 93-00) ERC (03-) ICV (04-08) PNV (80-82; 93-00)	AIC (87-93) CG (87-89) EA (96-08) PA (00-04) PAR (87-00) UV (96-99)	AHI/AM/CAN (91-93) <sup>2</sup> CDN (95-96 03-) EA-N (95-96) EE (95-99) PNG (87-91) PR (87-95) PRC (95-) PSM (99-03; 07-) UM (87-95, 99-03, 07-) UPCA (91-95) URAS (95-99)
	Relevance		HB (89-93)	CHA (00-08) EE (77-93) NABAI (07-) PSUC (80-84) UPC (79-82)	AC-INC (87-91) AM (83-87) ARALAR (03-07) CNC (83-87) EH (99-05) HB-N (83-95) PAS (95-99) PCTV (05-09) PNV-N (83-87) PSG (87-91) UDF (87-91) UPC (83-87)
	Representation				AIPF (95-99; 03-07) CIM (83-87) CREX-PREX (95-99) EG (83-87) EU (83-87) FIEF (91-95) FNC (03-07) PCN (95-99) PSA-C (80-84) TC-PNC (99-03) UA (90-01) UIM (91-95) UPL (95-)

Source: Own preparation based on Tables 2 and 3. The definition of thresholds is taken from Sartori (1976). Duration time is in brackets.

1. It formed a part of the government parliamentary majority although it did not have ministers.
2. Parties that together with AIC formed CC from 1993 onwards.

## CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this work is to contribute to the conceptual discussion regarding NSWPs, in order to develop a double classification based on the Spanish case. The change in the definition of the concept (not without problems, as we have seen) has allowed us to

identify the variety of parties existing in Spain and to develop a classification on the basis of their territorial and electoral presence. This classification reveals the existence of four major sets of parties in Spain: (A) parties in the state sphere which, because of the existence of territorial alliances with other parties (the case of the PSOE-PSC, PP-UPN (and IU-ICV) are not present throughout the territory; (b) parties which present candidates and only gain representation in regional elections (the most numerous); c) those who present candidates in one region but gain representation in both the autonomous and general elections; (d) and, finally those parties (which we have called diaterritorial) that present and obtain representation (in autonomous or general elections) in more than one territory.

Secondly, we have measured the influence of the different NSWPs in the state and autonomous community arenas, distinguishing between different thresholds: the representation threshold, the relevance threshold and the government threshold. In accordance with these categories, only the PSC has occupied positions of government in its respective autonomous communities and at the state level. More numerous is the influential group of NSWPs that have occupied positions of government in the autonomous community arena and who have been relevant in the state arena. There are also numerous NSWPs that, while being governing parties in the autonomous communities, have not been able to overcome the threshold of representation in the Spanish Lower House. In addition there are some NSWPs that have been able to access representation in the state arena, and to be relevant in the autonomous arena, together with a very numerous group of formations that have been relevant in the autonomous community sphere but have nonetheless been unable to access representation at the state level. Overall, this classification shows the growing importance of the role that the NSWPs have played, since their inception, in governance on a state and autonomous community level in Spain. The conceptual observations regarding NSWPs have also allowed us to demonstrate a panorama of governance that is more complex than that which electoral studies have tended to emphasise to date.

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## **APPENDIX A. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF NSWP.**

AC-INC/ICAN: Asamblea Canaria-Izquierda Nacionalista Canaria, después Iniciativa Canaria Nacionalista.  
AGI: Agrupación Gomera Independiente.  
AHI: Agrupación Herreña Independiente.  
AIC/CC: Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias, después Coalición Canaria.  
AIPF: Agrupació Independent Popular de Formentera.  
AM: Asamblea Majorera.  
AP/PP: Alianza Popular, después Partido Popular.  
BNG: Bloque Nacionalista Galego.  
CAIC/PAR: Candidatura Aragonésista Independiente de Centro, después Partido Aragonés Regionalista.  
CDN: Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra.  
CDS: Centro Democrático y Social.  
CDU: Unión Demócrata Cristiana (Alemania)  
CG: Coalición Galega.  
CHA: Chunta Aragonésista.  
CIM: Candidatura Independiente de Menora.  
CiU: Convergencia i Unió.  
CNC: Convergencia Nacionalista Canaria.  
CREX: Coalición Regional Extremeña.  
C's: Ciutadans-Ciudadanos – Partido de la ciudadanía.  
CSU: Unión Social Cristiana (Alemania)  
EA: Eusko Alkartasuna.  
EE: Euskadiko Ezquerria.  
EG: Esquerda Galega.  
ERC: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya.  
EU: Extremadura Unida.  
FIEF: Federación Independientes Ibiza y Formentera.  
FNC: Federación Nacionalista Canaria.  
HB: Herri Batasuna.  
HB/EH: Herri Batasuna. después Euskal Herritarrok.  
ICV: Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds.  
IU: Izquierda Unida  
NaBai: Nafarroa Bai.  
PACTE: Pacte Progresista.  
PAR: Partido Aragonés Regionalista, después Partido Aragonés.  
PAS: Partíu Asturianista.  
PCN: Plataforma Canaria Nacionalista.  
PCE-IU: Partido Comunista de España, después Izquierda Unida.  
PCTV: Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas.  
PNV: Partido Nacionalista Vasco.  
PP: Partido Popular  
PR: Partido Riojano Progresista, después Partido Riojano.  
PRC: Partido Regionalista de Cantabria.  
PREX: Partido Regionalista Extremeño.  
PSA/PA: Partido Socialista de Andalucía, después Partido Andalucista.  
PSC-PSOE: Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya-PSOE.  
PSG- Partido Socialista Galego.  
PSM: Partit Socialista de Mallorca- Entesa Nacionalista.  
PSMen: Partit Socialista de Menoría.  
PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español.  
PSUC: Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya  
TC-PNC: Tierra Comunera-Partido Nacionalista de Castilla.  
UA: Unidad Alavesa.  
UCD: Unión del Centro Democrático.  
UC-DCC: Unió del Centre i la Democràcia Cristiana per Catalunya.  
UDF: Unión Democrática Foral.  
UIM: Unió Independent de Mallorca.  
UM: Unió Mallorquina.  
UPC: Unión del Pueblo Canario.  
UPCA: Unión para el Progreso de Cantabria.  
UPL: Unión del Pueblo Leonés.  
UPN: Unión del Pueblo Navarro  
URAS: Unión Renovadora Asturiana.  
UV: Unión Valenciana.

**APPENDIX B. ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION BY NSWP IN SPAIN.****Table B1. Votes and seats of Non-statewide Parties in the Lower House (1977- 2008)**

	C		I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII		VIII		IX	
	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S
PSC	4,8	15	4,9	17	7,5	25	6,4	21	5,5	20	5,4	18	6,1	19	5,0	17	6,1	21	6,6	25
CIU	2,8 <sup>1</sup>	11	2,7	8	3,7	12	5,0	18	5,0	18	4,9	17	4,6	16	4,2	15	3,2	10	3,1	10
PNV	1,6	8	1,7	7	1,9	8	1,5	6	1,2	5	1,2	5	1,3	5	1,5	7	1,6	7	1,2	6
ERC	0,8 <sup>2</sup>	1	0,7	1	0,7	1	-	-	-	-	0,8	1	0,7	1	0,8	1	2,5	8	1,2	3
AIC/CC					-	-	0,3	1	0,3	1	0,9	4	0,9	4	1,1	4	0,9	3	0,7	2
PSUC/ICV	3,1	8	2,9	8	0,8	1	0,6	1	1,1	3	1,7	3	1,2	3	0,5	1	0,9	2	0,6	1
UPN	-	-	0,2	1 <sup>3</sup>	0,4	2 <sup>3</sup>	0,4	2 <sup>3</sup>	0,5	3 <sup>3</sup>	0,5	3 <sup>3</sup>	0,5	2 <sup>3</sup>	0,7	3 <sup>3</sup>	0,5	2 <sup>3</sup>	0,5	2 <sup>3</sup>
BNG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,9	2	1,3	3	0,8	2	0,8	2
HB	-	-	1,0	3	1,0	2	1,2	5	1,1	4	0,9	2	0,7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSA/PA	-	-	1,8	5	-	-	-	-	1,0	2	-	-	-	-	0,9	1	-	-	-	-
CAIC/PAR	0,2	1	0,2	1	-	-	0,4	1	0,4	1	0,6	1	- <sup>4</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EE	0,3	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0,5	2	0,5	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,7	2	0,6	1	0,5	1	0,4	1	0,3	1	-	-
NaBai	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,2	1	0,2	1
UV	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,3	1	0,7	2	0,5	1	0,4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
CHA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,3	1	0,4	1	-	-
UC-DCC	0,9	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CG	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UPC	-	-	0,3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Ministry of the Interior ([www.mir.es](http://www.mir.es)). Table arranged according to the number of seats and the percentage of votes obtained in different elections. Only parties or coalitions standing for elections are taken into consideration.

Notes: 1. PDC (CDC+PSCr+EDC). 2. ERC+PTE. 3. UPN-PP. 4. PP-PAR.

Abbreviations: See list of abbreviations in the appendices.

Table B2. Votes and seats obtained by NSWPs in the Autonomous Communities (I)

	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII		VIII	
	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S
<b>CATALUÑA</b>																
CIU	28,0	43	47,0	72	46,0	69	46,7	70	41,4	60	38,1	56	31,2	46	32,2	48
PSC-PSOE	22,6	33	30,3	41	30,0	42	27,9	40	25,1	34	38,2 <sup>1</sup>	52	31,4	42	27,4	37
ERC	9,0	14	4,4	5	4,2	6	8,1	11	9,6	13	8,9	12	16,6	23	14,3	21
PSUC/ICV	18,9	25	5,6	6	7,8	9	6,5	7	9,8	11	2,5 <sup>1</sup>	3	7,4	9	9,7	12
PSA	2,7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>PAIS VASCO</b>																
PNV	38,1	25	42	32	23,7	17	28,5	22	29,8	22	28	21	42,7 <sup>2</sup>	26	38,7 <sup>2</sup>	22
EA	-	-	-	-	15,8	13	11,4	9	10,3	8	8,7	6	- <sup>2</sup>	7	- <sup>2</sup>	7
HB/EH	16,6	11	14,7	11	17,5	13	18,3	13	16,3	11	17,9	14	10,1	7	-	-
PCTV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,4	9
Aralar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,3	1
EE	9,8	6	8	6	10,9	9	7,8	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UA	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,4	3	2,7	5	1,3	2	-	-	0,3	0
<b>NAVARRA</b>																
UPN	23,5	13	24,8	14	35,0	20	31,3	17	41,4	22	41,5	23	42,2	22		
CDN	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,6	10	6,9	3	7,7	4	4,4	2		
HB	10,6	6	13,7	7	11,2	6	9,2	5	15,6	8	-	-	-	-		
Aralar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,8	4	<sup>3</sup>	<sup>3</sup>		
EA	-	-	7,1	4	5,5	3	4,6	2	5,4 <sup>2</sup>	3 <sup>2</sup>	7,4	4	<sup>3</sup>	<sup>3</sup>		
PNV	6,9	3	1,0	0	1,1	0	1,0	0	<sup>2</sup>	<sup>2</sup>	<sup>2</sup>	<sup>2</sup>	<sup>3</sup>	<sup>3</sup>		
NaBai	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23,6	12		
EE	-	-	3,4	1	2,1	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
UDF	-	-	6,3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
<b>CANARIAS</b>																
AIC/CC	-	-	20,3	11	22,9	16	33,2	21	37,5	24	33,3	23	24,2	17		
AHÍ	0,2	1	0,2	2	0,2	1	0,3	1	0,34	2	-	-	0,3	2		
AM	1	3	0,8	3	0,7	2	<sup>12</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
AC-INC/ICAN	-	-	7,0	2	12,3	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
AGI	0,89	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
FNC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,9	3	-	-		
PCN	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,0	4	-	-	-	-	-	-		
UPC	8,5	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
CNC	4,4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
<b>GALICIA</b>																
BNG	6,3 <sup>4</sup>	3	4,2	1	8	5	18,6	13	25,1	18	22,3	17	18,9	13		
PSG	<sup>4</sup>	<sup>4</sup>	5,7 <sup>5</sup>	3	3,8 <sup>5</sup>	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
EG	3,4	1	<sup>5</sup>	<sup>5</sup>	<sup>5</sup>	<sup>5</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
CG	-	-	13,0	11	3,7	2	0,4	0	-	-	-	-	-	-		
<b>ARAGÓN</b>																
PAR	20,6	13	28,6	19	25,0	17	20,8	14	13,5	10	11,4	8	12,3	9		
CHA	-	-	1	0	2,3	0	4,9	2	11,3	5	14,0	9	8,3	4		



Table B2. Votes and seats obtained by NSWPs in the Autonomous Communities (II)

	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII		VIII	
	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S	%VV	S
<b>CANTABRIA</b>																
PRC	6,8	2	13	5	6,5	2	14,8	6	13,9	6	19,7	8	29,4	12		
UPCA	-	-	-	-	34,1	15	17	7	3,2	0	-	-	-	-		
<b>BALEARES</b>																
UM	15,4	6	9,3	4	<sup>6</sup>	<sup>6</sup>	5,3	2	7,5	3	7,6	3	6,9	3		
PSM <sup>7</sup>	6,7	4	6,3	4	8,1	5	12,4	6	11,9	5	8,1	4	10,0	5		
<i>PSM Mallorca</i>	5,5	2	5,0	2	6,7	3	11,3	5	11,9	5	8,1	4	9,2 <sup>8</sup>	4		
<i>PSM Menorca</i>	1,2	2	1,3 <sup>9</sup>	2	1,39 <sup>9</sup>	2	1,1 <sup>9</sup>	1	-	-	-	-	0,8 <sup>10</sup>	1		
PACTE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,5 <sup>11</sup>	6	3,7	5	-	-		
AIPF	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,32	1	0,3	0	0,4	1	0,4	1		
FIEF	-	-	-	-	0,74	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
UIM	-	-	-	-	2,5	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
CIM	1,1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
<b>LA RIOJA</b>																
PR	7,5	2	5,1	2	5,5	2	6,8	2	5,9	2	6,9	2	6,1	2		
<b>ANDALUCÍA</b>																
PSA/PA	5,4	3	5,9	2	10,9	10	5,8	3	6,7	4	7,4	5	6,2	5	2,8	0
<b>VALENCIA</b>																
UV	-	-	9,2	6	10,5	7	7,1	5	4,8	0	3,0	0	1,0	0		
<b>ASTURIAS</b>																
PAS	-	-	1,3	0	2,8	1	3,2	1	2,6	0	1,9	0	<sup>12</sup>	<sup>12</sup>		
URAS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,3	3	2,9	0	2,3 <sup>12</sup>	0 <sup>12</sup>		
<b>CAST-LEON</b>																
UPL	-	-	-	-	0,84	0	2,6	2	3,8	3	3,9	2	2,7	2		
TC-PNC	-	-	-	-	0,1	0	0,63	0	1,4	1	1,2	0	1,1	0		
<b>EXTREMADURA</b>																
EU	8,5	6	5,9	4	2,5	0	-	-	1,7	0	1,9	0	-	-		
CREX-PREX					1,5 <sup>13</sup>	0 <sup>13</sup>	3,9 <sup>14</sup>	1 <sup>14</sup>	1,2	0	-	-	-	-		

**Source:** Archivo Histórico Comunidades Autonomas, Presidencia de la Generalitat Valenciana (<http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/archivo/index.html>). Only parties or coalitions standing for elections are taken into consideration.

**Notes:** 1. Coalition with Ciutadans pel Canvi and ICV (in Lleida, Girona and Tarragona). ICV only stood in Barcelona; 2. Coalition of EA-PNV. In the Basque Country, with separate parliamentary groups; 3. NaBai coalition ; 4. Bloque-PSG coalition; 5. PSG-EG coalition. 6. PP-UM coalition; 7. Presents the aggregate PSM data, and the disaggregated data for PS Mallorca and PS Menorca, corresponding to their respective constituencies (in italics); 8. SMP, Entesa, EU-UV, ERC coalition; 9. PSMen-EU coalition; 10. PSMen-Verds coalition; 11. PSOE, EV, EU, IN, ERC coalition; 12. URA-PAS coalition; 13. PREX candidacy; 14. EU-CREX-PREX coalition

**Abbreviations:** see list of abbreviations in the appendices.